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ABSTRACT
While Chinese economic development is often at the forefront of conversations by scholars
shaping economic policy, further investigation into the state of China’s economy has left a gap in
research. Through analyzing the 13th Five Year Plan (FYP) and looking specifically at the effect
it will have on unemployment, international trade, overcapacity rates, and the Belt and Road
Initiative, the goal of this research is to understand if China will be able to obtain sustained
economic growth. In order to achieve this, this research employs a qualitative discourse analysis,
focusing on pre-existing works that discuss Chinese economic development. It will also conduct
a case analysis of Chinese policies that target overcapacity, unemployment, and international
trade. In utilizing a secondary data analysis methodology, this research will analyze the relevant
policies presented in the 13th FYP and determine if it will solve the problems currently facing
the Chinese economy. Ultimately, this research concludes China may be heading towards an
economic recession should the government choose to have an overreliance on the Belt and Road
Initiative and not heed the warning signs present within its economy.
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INTRODUCTION

China has been growing rapidly but studies show that growth rates have been steadily declining
in recent years. Literature suggests that China has encountered certain problems that will slow
down their economy and economic indicators are showing warning signs of a looming recession.
To combat this, China has implemented their 13th Five Year Plan to counter the effects of
rampant unemployment, overcapacity, and an increasingly competitive international market.
Through employing a secondary data analysis, this research will demonstrate that the
aforementioned indicators will ultimately have a substantial impact on the overall health of the
Chinese economy.

By focusing this research on the three indicators of economic growth listed above, it is the
objective of this research to explore and analyze the 13th Five Year Plan. In doing so, this thesis
will ultimately attempt to develop an understanding if the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has
the ability to pivot and create long-lasting, sustainable growth. If these markers are not
addressed, it is an expectation that stagnant unemployment, growing overcapacity, and a
diminishing global reliance in the trade sector will ultimately lead to a recession.

Contained within this research is a literature review of the Chinese market economy structure
and how the implementation of modest capitalism has created an over-zealous government
whose ambitions have far outweighed the reality in the late 20th and early 21st century.
Following this is a discussion on international trade and unemployment, two key factors in
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ascertaining long-term economic viability. Following this literature review will be a discussion
of the research design and hypothesis that will culminate in an analysis of the 13th Five Year
Plan. Specifically looking at unemployment, overproduction, and international trade, this
research will evaluate the current health of the Chinese economy and what is seen as the essence
of the Plan and solution for all: The Belt and Road Initiative. Finally, this research will determine
the possible future ramifications for China.
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BACKGROUND

Since the fall of the Mao dynasty, China has made it a priority to not only stray away from a
traditional communist system of governance, but to embrace some of the fundamental economic
ideas of Adam Smith, David Ricardo, and Jean-Baptiste. However, that in itself does not explain
how the People’s Republic of China went from one of the poorest countries in the world to a
superpower whose GDP per capita growth rates have averaged in the double digits for over ten
consecutive years.

After reviewing relevant literature, two prevalent factors that have led to China’s exponential
growth rates in terms of GDP are the dramatic increases in international trade and a renewed
commitment to a market-based economy. But with an average growth rate of 9.49% since 1989,
there is a mounting debate whether the PRC has to ability to sustain its current economic trend
line (Trading Economics 2019). Through its incessant overproduction, overcapacity, and
staggering unemployment rates, economic indicators are beginning to show an inability for the
Chinese economy to continue at its existing pace. Because of this, it is imperative that an
increasing amount of research be dedicated to ascertaining if leadership in the People’s Republic
are aware of the dire problems in their state.

Current literature available that discusses the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) understands its goal
of generating multi-trillion-dollar trade by creating economic corridors and trade routes,
complete with infrastructure that will link China to Russia, Europe and East Africa via Pakistan,
and Central and Western Asia (Hallding and Zhang 2015). Additionally, it has been
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acknowledged by leadership within the Chinese government that overproduction is a serious
problem. But solutions to this problem have varied and been largely unsuccessful. As such, the
next section will be a discussion on pre-existing literature revolving around Chinese economic
development will ensue and demonstrate what has led to this research.

4

LITERATURE REVIEW

Within current literature, two arguments are readily available and present compelling evidence.
The first revolves around China’s current economic state and its growth rates. Researchers
Xingming Fang and H. Holly Wang have held that so long as the environment is able to
withstand rapid industrialization, there is little in the way of the PRC becoming a globally
dominant force in nearly every category. They continue this theory and state that, “eliminating
backward production capacity and efficiency small factories will solve the problem of "triple
highness" and thus, China will realize sustainable high economic growth” (Fang and Wang 4647). However, as economic indicators continue to become increasingly available and more
research is conducted on the health of China’s economy, an alternative hypothesis has been
presented. Contained within this alternative is a troubling future wrought with global
implications. Economic indicators are beginning to show that what lies ahead is not opulence,
but disparity. Leading researchers Roger Chen and Yiping Huang have extensively studied this
theory and ultimately, a forthcoming recession may be in China’s future. This literature review
will follow in the footsteps of Chen and Huang in attempting to further understand the
underlying indicators that are indicative of the future health of a state’s economy.

A MARKET BASED ECONOMY

Economic development can occur in many different forms depending on a myriad of reasons
such as population, geographic location, topography, and leadership structure. However, in many
cases, one of the driving forces begins with a commitment to a market-based economy.
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Following the collapse of the Maoist regime, a realization was made that the current socialist
structure was not economically viable. As a result, major shifts in the political climate occurred,
beginning with the 1988 Constitutional Amendment to include the private sector as a
“complement” to the socialist economy (Brødsgaard and Ruuten 2017, 155). While this may
seem like an insignificant step in transitioning to a market economy, it was in fact the driving
force the spread throughout the minds of politicians. Five years following the amendment, the
concept of a “socialist market economy” was brought fourth and later the Third Plenum of the
14th Central Committee adopted a decision in which the market was to play a “basic” role in the
economy (Brødsgaard and Ruuten 2017). A prime example of this implementation was through
the role of the labor force. Traditionally speaking, one of the most notable aspects of the Chinese
socialist system was the perception of life-long employment. But as ideologies began to shift, the
employee to employer relationship changed dramatically and was governed by market-based
demand (Lo 2007, 204). However, given the inherent diversity in the Chinese economy from
agriculture to urban development, the approach needed to be multifaceted. In its rural sector,
three major steps were implemented: the contract responsibility system, concept of individual
household farming, and the intersectionality with a free market (Perkins 1988). In its urban
markets, China emphasized the expansion of enterprise autonomy as well as economic incentives
(Tidrick and Chen 1987). In doing so, the PRC introduced a “dual price system” (Liou 2009,
S29-30). As this system began to take root throughout the 1990s, the growth path was inherently
capital-deepening and a result of the marketized economic system (Lo 2007, 209).

However, directly after the onset of the East Asian Economic Crisis in 1998, state leadership
implemented a wide variety of economic policies that amounted to a complete reversal of
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previously unidirectional market reforms. It has always been the primary objective of Chinese
leadership that economic growth and compensation-enhancing expansion in labor employment
must both proceed smoothly, and in tandem (Lo 2007, 193-194). As such, China developed four
crisis prevention policies: 1. Fiscal packages to expand investment demand that were to be
financed by debt issuing, 2. Welfare state polices that included retirement and unemployment
benefits, increasing public sector wages, as well as lengthening paid holidays – all of which was
aimed at reversing the expansion of stagnant consumption, 3. Policy measures to re-invigorate
the public sector, including setting up four state asset management companies whose task was
improving the financial state of certain State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) by taking a substantial
portion of non-performing loans from state banks, and 4. The reformation of external
transactions, specifically, leadership’s shelving the target of liberalizing the state’s capital
account (Lo 2007, 201).

Since the time of the crisis, the PRC has doubled down on its commitment to a laissez-faire
economy through additional changes at the federal level. Most notably was in November 2013
where the verbiage was changed from the 1993 position. Under the new Constitution, markets
would no longer play a “basic” role, but a decisive role in the Chinese economy. Additionally, it
underlined the market’s ability to determine the price of goods, including natural resources and
energy (National People’s Congress Observer 2018). Articles 6,7, and 12 were also updated to
further align with the state’s new goals. Through the establishment of a mixed ownership system,
including allowing investments in publicly owned entities, a reversal of SOE subsidies for oil,
electricity, and water, as well as an opening toward outside financial markets, China successfully
created a potential goldmine for both the domestic and international economy.
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However, legislative action only tells part of the story and it is important to understand what
sectors China has gravitated towards. To answer this question, one must review the growth in
wage rates following the end of an era known for its ‘unlimited’ supply of labor. Though this has
resulted in decreased profit margins and shifting away from labor intensive markets, it has also
caused a huge comparative advantage for China as it improved its technological sectors. Between
1998 and 2003, Chinese labor productivity grew substantially quicker than real wages. Because
of this growth in productivity, the PRC has been able to minimize the international and domestic
inflation that is commonly associated with rising labor costs (Garnaut and Huang n.d., 26).
Consequently, further global restructuring was stimulated.

With this stimulation, a realization that an emphasis on invention to produce innovation was no
longer needed as in years past. Instead, as the technological revolution continues to speed up, an
increased reliance on the borrowing of technologies has created room for great innovation. By
analyzing technological innovation against borrowing in industrial vs developing states, we
begin to see the opportunity costs associated with states like the PRC in the early 1990s. As
Yiping Huang noted, developing countries have the ability to borrow newly existing
technological advancements from industrialized states in addition to inventing technology. Thus,
developing states have the ability to benefit from the technological gap by way of licensing,
imitation and so on. Ultimately, this results in a higher rate of technological innovation than that
of a previously industrialized state (Garnaut and Huang n.d., 53-54). It is here that China did in
fact capitalize in the decades following the collapse of the Maoist regime.
.
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INTERNATIONAL TRADE

The most commonly identified reasons for international investment are cheap labor and domestic
market potential (Garnaut and Huang n.d., 18). As part of this picture, one must also review how
such borrowing of technologies has affected domestic markets as it relates to access. Because
China placed an emphasis on Special Economic Zones (SEZs), technological borrowing
provided opportunities to introduce foreign capital as well as rules and values (Liou 2009, S30).
From the viewpoint of local governments, the most influential aspects of the open-door policy
are the development of economically open coastal areas and the application of SEZs. Through
these two fundamental ideas, foreign trade, foreign direct investment, and the promotion of
tourism saw drastic increases (Bartik 1991). In reviewing Appendix A, note the changes in the
difference between real GDP (A) and employment (B) from 1978 to 1990. Then contrast this
information with the data from 1990-2006. Additionally, one should review the lack of
difference between employment (B) with labor force (C). These figures represent an economy
that is accelerating at a rate that is not only unsustainable, but may be dangerous for the global
economy, should the country slip into a recession given its trade outputs to the rest of the world.

From January to June of 2006, though import and export growth rates fell, trade surplus
expanded by 54.9 percent. Combined with a continued influx in foreign direct investment (FDI),
foreign exchange reserves contributed to a US$123 billion increase. By the end of the first half
of the year, China’s reserves were the largest in the world at US$941 billion (Garnaut and Huang
n.d., 15). According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), in weighing countries' labor
force by their export-to-GDP ratio, the effective global labor supply quadrupled between 1980
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and 2005, with East Asia contributing about half of the increase. And, over this period, there was
an accelerating trend of massive relocation of industry and jobs from the rest of East Asia to
China. Using this same model, by the end of 2005, China became a supplier of 25% of the
world’s labor force (Lo 2007, 207-208).

As we apply the aforementioned statistics to ascertain the wholistic impact trade has had on
Chinese economic development, in 1998, the total exports vs. US trade deficit were within
roughly US$56.9 billion. But in less than ten years, that figure drastically increased, with a net
difference of US$268 billion. Today, it has grown to a staggering US$375 billion. Additionally,
all fifty states with the U.S. have reported trade deficits with China (Liou 2009, S33). See
Appendix B.

OVERPRODUCTION AND OVERCAPACITY

Though at the surface these changes should undoubtedly result in an extremely robust economy,
underlying aspects of a deeply troubled economy began to surface relatively early on in the
Chinese economic explosion. In 1997, the Asian Financial Crisis absolutely devastated Asian
markets and forced China to devalue its own economy with the intention of making exports more
attractive to neighboring markets as well as less expensive in western markets. It is here that the
overcapacity began and through the diminishing exportation of goods, an inability to fix the issue
of unemployment has also resulted (Chen 1998, 31-32). As of 2017, the PRC produced more
than half of the world’s output of steel, aluminum, cement, and coal. However, as a result of a
slowing economic growth pattern, China was unable to absorb the output of production. With an
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economy that is absolutely enthralled by the concept of excessive investment and lower
consumption, overcapacity within the production sectors of the Chinese economy became
increasingly visible.

Following an analysis of the Chinese steel and cement sectors, these fears were quantified.
According to an EU–China Chamber of Commerce report (2016), in 2014, the steel sector in the
PRC had a combined output capacity of 1.14 billion tons, but their utilization rate was 71%. This
indicates a massive excess capacity that is equivalent to nearly the total output of Japan, India,
the United States, and Russia combined. As this same approach is applied to the cement sector,
an equally bleak picture is present. In just two years, between 2011 and 2013, China used more
cement than the United States did in the entire 20th century. As the global leader, China
produces 57% of the global output. In total, the capacity of the Chinese cement industry is a
staggering 3.1 billion tons. And in the same year the PRC utilized 71% of its steel (2014), it
produced 2.25 billion tons of cement: a utilization rate of 73%. Yet, these problems continue to
remain largely unimproved and investment continues to be poured in (Brødsgaard and Ruuten
2017, 158).

Simultaneous to this, SOEs began to invest in the domestic real estate market as a source of
revenue. But as the housing market began to decline, oversupply continued to rise, and those
investments quickly turned into liabilities. As a result, some of these state-owned enterprises
sank into financial ruin and local governments have been forced to assume those debts. Because
of this modest economic slowdown, demand for heavy-industrial products declined, yet once
again, capacity continued to rise (Brødsgaard and Ruuten 2017, 154-157). In a recent news
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article posted by the South China Morning Post, regional authorities have issued US$163.8
billion in debt since the start of 2019, four times that of year-earlier period (Zhou and Lee 2019).
Figure 1 within Supplementary Materials illustrate this worry.

These missteps by SOEs are not exclusively a product of their own miscalculation. Because the
state was pushing for continued growth in all sectors, large SOEs were allowed to merge in the
areas of steel, shipping, and nuclear power in order to “compete at the global level”. This
philosophy worked completely against the spirit of what the Chinese market-based economy was
founded on and economic growth plummeted from 15.4% to 6.7%, the lowest since 1990
(Brødsgaard and Ruuten 2017, 157).

In 2005 as the state began to prepare for the 11th Five-Year Plan, authorities increased the effort
to achieve balanced economic growth. Their goal was to increase consumption relative to
investment as well as bolster domestic demand in relation to external demand. Members of the
National People’s Congress (NPC) took steps to consolidate industries that were deemed ‘high
risk’ for overcapacity. Additionally, they warned commercial banks of loan expansion and
tightened functioning conditions in order to curb excessive investment (Garnaut and Huang n.d.,
13). This plan, however, failed as overproduction and overcapacity continued to balloon.

In 2009 Chinese officials again admitted to the serious problems their economy was facing due
to overcapacity and that local governments were “blindly” continuing to expand capacity. Yet
despite an acute understanding of the issue and of the potential damage it may cause to domestic
and international markets, no concentrated effort to curb the problem was made (Brødsgaard and
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Rutten 2017, 5). Instead, the government created a substantial stimulus package worth US$586
billion that benefitted these sectors (The Economist 2008). As we look into the future or possibly
the current state of Sino-American relations, if a prolonged trade war were to occur, China could
become an exporter of inflation (Garnaut and Huang n.d., 23).
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RESEARCH DESIGN AND HYPOTHESIS

While Chinese economic development is often at the forefront of conversations held by leading
scholars shaping economic policy domestically and abroad, further investigation into the current
state of China’s economy has left a gap in research. Through analyzing the 13th Five Year Plan
and looking specifically at the effect it will have on unemployment, international trade levels,
and current overcapacity rates, this research will attempt to understand if China will be able to
obtain sustained economic growth.

While the PRC does contribute a majority of the world’s supply of industrial materials, there can
only be so much of a state’s economy dedicated to international trade. As developing states
continue to industrialize, that proportion should continue to decrease in order to maintain a
balanced economy. It is important to understand how or if the aforementioned reforms will alter
the current employment rates and production capacity. In order to achieve this, this research will
employ a qualitative discourse analysis, focusing on pre-existing works that discuss Chinese
economic development. As such, this thesis will also conduct a case analysis of Chinese policies
that target overcapacity, unemployment, and international trade levels. Finally, a prediction will
be made about the viability of the Chinese economy. In utilizing a secondary data analysis
methodology, this research will analyze the relevant policies presented in the 13th FYP and
determine if they will solve the problems currently facing the Chinese economy. And ultimately
will culminate in a preliminary prediction that concludes China may be heading towards a path
of economic recession should the government choose not to heed the warning signs present
within its economy and over rely on its trademark Belt and Road Initiative.
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A PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS OF THE 13TH FIVE YEAR PLAN

Because China views its economy as invariably dynamic, Five Year Plans have become a
centerpiece in combatting mounting pressure both domestically and abroad to ensure regional
stability. After reviewing the 13th Five Year Plan in its entirety, it is the opinion of this research
that the Belt and Road Initiative is seen as an integral piece to solving the mounting issue of
overproduction and overcapacity, unemployment, and increased competition in international
trade markets. Due to the scale of the project, the amount of resources required, and variety of
resources needed, the BRI may hold the answers China seeks. However, to understand how this
is possible, it is critical that the government within the PRC realize the factors that have
contributed to the onset of the aforementioned issues.

OVERPRODUCTION AND OVERCAPACITY

China’s continual growth has enabled it to firmly remain as a driving force within the world’s
economy. With an increase in its per capita gross domestic product (GDP) to 49,351 (US$7,924)
in 2015, it has become increasingly difficult to understand how the Chinese economy can be
boundlessly expanding, yet in utter turmoil (CCCPC, 7). But with any systemic issue, broad
understanding of the problem is the first step in determining possible solutions. With a rich and
proud history, the PRC has dealt with an inability to acknowledge systemic problems within its
government in the past. However, for one of the first times, the state has recognized the
inequality within its own development model and understands that if rapid change does not
occur, China as it is known may cease to exist:
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“we must be soberly aware that China’s development model is inefficient; uneven,
uncoordinated, and unsustainable development continues to be a prominent problem; the
change of pace in economic growth, structural adjustments, and the transformation of the
drivers of growth present interwoven problems; and we face a host of challenges, such as
ensuring steady growth, carrying out structural adjustments, guarding against risks, and
bringing benefit to the people… The foundations of agriculture are still weak,
overcapacity is a serious problem in certain sectors, commodity housing inventory is
high, corporate profits are sliding, and debt continues to grow. Development is uneven
between rural and urban areas and between regions, spatial development is inefficient,
resource constraints grow increasingly tight, and the continuing trend toward further
ecological and environmental degradation is yet to be fundamentally reversed” (CCCPC,
11-12).

According to the PRC, the lack of adaptation in the fundamentals for long-term economic growth
and breadth of economic development prospects have caused issues of overcapacity within their
production areas of emphasis. They seem to have developed an understanding that in order to
“upgrade the economy”, improvements must be made to the quality and efficiency of growth
(CCCPC, 11). To implement this idea, the state believes that it must be the driving force in
economic development that simultaneously is working to achieve an appropriate expansion of
aggregate demand, carry out supply-side structural reform to satisfy China’s “ever growing,
constantly upgrading, and increasingly individualized material, cultural, ecological, and
environmental needs” (CCCPC 20-21).
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To further combat this issue, the PRC is seeking to strengthen policy guidance and set up a fund
to reward companies who make structural adjustments to their industry. By ensuring compliance
with “the standards for the production process, technology, energy consumption, environmental
protection, quality, and safety”, it is their goal to tighten industry regulations and market entry
management in order to shut down outdated production facilities. Though these adjustments
pertain to all manufacturing, the plan directly addresses overcapacity issues in steel and coal by
applying additional restrictions, “through mergers, reorganizations, debt restructurings,
bankruptcy liquidations, and better asset utilization; [the government will] proactively and
prudently handle the winding up of enterprises in an organized way on the basis of classification;
and ensure that employees laid off from such enterprises are properly resettled” (CCCPC, 62).

UNEMPLOYMENT

In analyzing unemployment within China, statistics show that as the state nears the completion
of the five-year cycle, unemployment has remained firmly imbedded within society. Appendix C
demonstrates this as the unemployment rate from 2008 to 2018 have remined virtually
unchanged. According to data obtained by the World Bank and released in September 2019,
unemployment has seen a negligible decrease. Using population estimates obtained by the World
Bank Population Division, the PRC currently has a population estimated at roughly 1.4 billion
people. Based on the data listed above, this translates to 27 million men and 33 million women
that are still without work (World Bank 2019).
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This information comes as employment is listed as a “major goal”. Yet even with that, it is only
mentioned in their fulfillment of previous goals and is completely left off of attainment goals for
the next five-year period. In reviewing Appendix D, note the lack of data publicly available
within integral indicators of the “Wellbeing of the People.”

Despite this, China has presented some solutions to the income disparity levels. By improving
primary income distribution, intensifying efforts to regulate income redistribution, adjusting and
optimizing the pattern of national income distribution, and working to bridge income gaps
throughout society, they hope to achieve zero unemployment (CCCPC, 180). However,
governments with similar ambitions of the redistribution of wealth have proven that this method
is grotesquely inefficient and ultimately without rigid enforcement mechanisms, not a viable
solution. This discrepancy underscores the issues within the PRC. A desire to show only the
positive economic indicators while subtlety leaving out major factors has continued to push them
further into a false sense of economic euphoria.

This is not to say that the Chinese government should implement a flat tax system as it has one
of the largest shares of the world’s billionaires, but with it being increasingly easy to hide money
from publicly accessible information for the purposes of taxation, a reliance on the redistribution
of wealth may not lead to the end result the government is in search of.

As a stated goal within the 13th Five Year Plan, the Chinese government has vowed to operate
near full employment while simultaneously minimizing the income gap and increase the
proportion of middle-income earners. “China’s current poverty line will be able to lift themselves

18

out of poverty, all poor counties will be able to rid themselves of poverty, and poverty alleviation
will be achieved in all regions” (CCCPC, 16). With elements of Marxism present, it is
undoubtedly a bold plan for the future. However, what is interesting is throughout the entirety of
the 13th Five Year Plan, the government makes no claims as to the cause for the systemic issue.

Regardless of this, in discussing the Developmental Environment within China, the Plan
discusses the issue of “abundant human capital” and its effects on the economy (CCCPC, 11).
This is especially important in the central and western regions of the country where
unemployment and poverty have become such an issue, that the state has been able to provide
little relief outside of subsidies. To this end, it is their goal to implement a more proactive
employment policy as opposed to a reactionary system that will in turn create more job
opportunities and encourage small business growth that creates high quality employment. By
doing this the state hopes to work to solve the problem of “structural unemployment” (CCCPC,
178). Additionally, the PRC is implementing a database system of recent college graduates who
have not found employment. Through this database, the government plans to provide guidance
and internships as well as gain experience through community-level work. This coupled with
vocational skill training for migrant workers and special employment needs, the government
says, should produce meaningful results.

China has also begun a movement to implement the Made in China 2025 action plan. As part of
this, they hope to be able to further galvanize the innovative capacity and capability of
manufacturing. To achieve this, they will focus on the integration of information and
manufacturing technology and promote the development of high-end, smart, green, and service-
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oriented manufacturing to foster competition within manufacturing (CCCPC, 60). By integrating
Chinese influence around the world through the Belt and Road Initiative, the increased
accessibility to new markets in globally South countries could create increased demand of
Chinese goods that could in turn play very well to the success of their action plan

INTERNATIONAL TRADE

In discussing their aspirations for international trade, the PRC considers the developing world
and its consistent economic gains as they continue to become a part of the global market. On top
of this, international investments and trade regulations have been restructured to allow for
multilateral trading systems to advance; thus, China sees greater risk and uncertainty in its ability
to further develop (CCCPC, 11). Yet even in an era of potential uncertainty and regional
instability, China is continuing to pursue a capital deepening approach. To this end, they hope to
balance imports and exports, work to attract foreign investment, technology and talent, and most
importantly participate at a greater level in the institutions that oversee global economic
governance, such as the World Bank and WTO (CCCPC, 21).

To achieve this, the government seems to want to leverage skilled labor for innovation in human
resource development. As such, it is not solely material capital, but human capital that China is
seeking to capitalize on as international markets continue to expand (CCCPC, 29). Given its
dominance in the technological sector, it is understandable that the government would seek to
optimize this control at the international level. Under their plan, there will be an increase in the
use of high technology and value-added exports (CCCPC, 33). By implementing an import/
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export strategy that promotes the development methods of production, China hopes to bolster a
section of their economy that makes up 16% of its foreign trade. In addition to this, the PRC is
attempting to further diversify its exports and develop new types to trade. In doing so, it is their
hope that current trade barriers will be reduced, and ongoing disputes will be neutralized while
simultaneously attempting to address the international outcry of tech dumping and flooding
international markets with cheaply made products (CCCPC, 143).

As part of their effort to “open up” to the rest of the world, China continuously hints at integral
components of the Belt and Road Initiative throughout the 13th Five Year Plan. As it relates to
international trade, they state the need to strengthen and develop cross-border multimodal
transport corridors. They will also accelerate the integration of cross-border economic
cooperation zones that will not only make Beijing and Shanghai seen as an internationally
influential center for scientific and technological innovation, but also support China’s interior, a
region that is desperate for support (CCCPC, 25). Though in order to achieve this for a prolonged
period of time, China must endeavor to fix an education system whose sights have been solely
fixated on leaving the country.

Historically, it was known that in order to obtain a world class education, families would send
their children to a university in Europe or the United States. Though this phenomenon has
changed to some degree, a vast number of students still seek to educate themselves at the
collegiate level outside of China. Because of this, the government has faced an issue of getting
those intellectuals to return for prolonged periods of time. In order to break this tradition, the
PRC has chosen to increase the mechanisms for support for international students in China. In
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reviewing Appendix E, China has placed a strong emphasis on domestic scholastic achievement
and describes the steps they have taken to further integrate talent into the Chinese job market. It
is their hope that if these students choose not to return immediately, that they will work for
international organizations. And as a result, further break down barriers inhibiting young
professionals from returning to China seeking permanent positions (CCCPC, 31).
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THE BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE

Originally issued jointly in March of 2015 by The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the National
Development and Reform Commission and the Ministry of Commerce, the Belt and Road
Initiative is a project of epic proportions that few could see coming (Meidan and Patey 2016, 4).
But what are the driving forces behind the initiative? The primary answer to this question can be
found through an analysis of Chinese infrastructure and how the government views the BRI.

In Appendix F, six distinct transportation projects were outlined in the 13th FYP that have direct
implications to rural and urban China, as well as internationally through the BRI. As part of this,
the PRC discusses the need to establish a comprehensive transportation thoroughfare running
from east to west and from north to south that ensure unobstructed and interconnected domestic
and international transportation (CCCPC, 79). In seeking to establish such routes, the
government has no choice but to bolster construction that connects economic zones in eastern
China with Xinjiang and Tibet. By doing so, it will encourage further development in western
China, a region that is currently under-utilized and grotesquely impoverished. By increasing
construction in the western region, it will also promote large scale development that directly
impacts the construction of the land aspect of the BRI.

It is also apparent in the 13 FYP that remote areas of China have an extreme emphasis placed
upon them. But it is not only the construction of a throughway to western Asia that is important
as it pertains to these regions, it is also the agricultural component that these lands possess.
Despite being much more arid than farming regions in the east, land is in abundance compared to
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other areas of China (CCCPC, 104). Because of this, it is the hope of the Chinese government
that innovations in agricultural methods will continue to drive the Belt and Road Initiative
westward and propel it into the spotlight.

In the central region of China, still minimal economic productivity occurs in comparison to the
east. This discrepancy between economic zones has created challenges for the Chinese economy.
To alleviate the pressure placed upon the government by the citizens, as unemployment
continues to remain stagnant and overcapacity is a perpetual dark cloud looming over prosperity,
the government has chosen to relocate industries from eastern China to the center (CCCPC, 106).
But in order to make this happen, new factories will need to be built. Though it is only the
beginning of a much larger solution, it is a start to being able to use the billions of tons of steel
and cement that factories have the capability to produce.

In order to do this successfully, the PRC understands that it must take advantage of a vast
landmass, unending human capital, and an industrial foundation that the Central and Western
regions of China are known for. And they must focus on “city clusters along the Yangtze, around
Chengdu and Chongqing, in central Henan province, around Hohhot, Baotou, Erdos and Yulin,
and around Harbin and Changchun to propel regional interaction and cooperation and industrial
concentration” (The State Council of the People’s Republic of China 2015). By doing this, the
ability to fully integrate China’s vast resources beyond the financial centers in the east into the
global market dramatically increases. Additionally, it is the hope of the PRC that this “opening
up” will rapidly decrease economic disparity markers that are present within rural China.
Specifically, they name Zhengzhou and Xi’an as cities of importance within inland China. By
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building airports, international land ports, and launching pilot e-commerce services for crossborder trade, the government will utilize this as a “stage 2” in their quest to fully integrate the
more than half a billion people that live in those regions, both socially and economically (The
State Council of the People’s Republic of China 2015). In analyzing the impact of the BRI, the
connection has been made that through the development of advanced infrastructure with
neighboring countries and rural lands, costs associated with transportation will be significantly
reduced (Center for Strategic and International Studies n.d.). Should it work, it would prove to be
a triumph for the state in areas of domestic and foreign economic development.

But these factors only help us to understand half the project. In addition to this modern-day land
bridge, China is also seeking to create new maritime trade routes that may fundamentally change
current shipping patterns. This project has two components: access to European markets and a
strategic emphasis on access to African markets. In establishing a plan to further integrate itself
in the European market, Chinese Premier Li Keqiang expressed his desire to construct the
Maritime Silk Road with a deliberate importance placed on orientation towards the Association
of Southeastern Nations (ASEAN) at the China-ASEAN Expo (Arase 2015, p. 25). By doing
this, the Premier hopes to not only achieve influence in neighboring Asian states, but also utilize
the South China Sea and South Pacific as a thoroughfare to developed Western Europe.

The other component involves the integration and arguably the exploitation of African markets.
To achieve this, the Initiative states that it must focus on creating “smooth, secure and efficient
transport routes connecting major sea ports along the Belt and Road” (The State Council of the
People’s Republic of China 2015). In turn, this means the creation of the China-Pakistan
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Economic Corridor and the Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar Economic Corridor. As it relates
to Africa, the PRC will be utilizing the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor that will connect
China to the Gwadar Port in the Arabian Sea. With nearly a quarter trillion dollars already spent
on the effort, Morgan Stanley has predicted Chinese expenses on the project could exceed $1.2
trillion by 2027 (Chatzky and McBride 2019).

Based on information obtained by the Mercator Institute for China Studies from the Chinese
government, it is clear that while some focus will be placed on connecting Beijing to western
Europe, the Maritime Silk Road will almost exclusively focus on Africa (See Figure 2 in
Supplementary Materials for a map of the Belt and Road Initiative). It can be speculated that the
reasoning for this is due to the scarcity of resources currently available for current port cities on
the African coast. This coupled with stops in India have opened the possibility for rapid
expansion of the Chinese economic system. Thus, allowing for a more economically diverse
opportunity to engage in trade with previously under-utilized regions of Africa, specifically
Kenya and Djibouti.

FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN BRI FOCUS REGIONS

It has long been a political strategy for China and Africa to have immense cooperation between
the two regions. However, following the turn of the century and the expansion of the Chinese
economy, this political relationship has transitioned into an economically strategic partnership
that is focused on South-South cooperation and an expansion of regional influence.

26

Originally created in 2000, the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) sought to create a
joint council by which state actors may conduct routine evaluations on the implementation of
Sino-African Social and Economic Development (FOCAC, n.d.). Since that time, this
relationship has grown tremendously in both size and relevance on the global stage. And with the
announcement of the Belt and Road Initiative, this relationship has only further intensified. At
the 2015 Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, an additional US$60 billion commitment was
made to Africa by the Chinese government that included financing for the Addis Ababa–Djibouti
railway, the Sudanese oil pipeline, and Djibouti military facility. Through commitments such as
these, China began to immediately push its interests throughout the continent, and with it, its
problems.

Reaching its peak in 2013, trade levels between Africa and China grew to US$ 207 Billion and
as such accounts from nearly 20% of bilateral trade flow for Africa (UN Comtrade 2014, 127).
Through this dramatic increase in interest in African markets by the PRC, it was not long before
private Chinese companies and individuals flocked to the region in search of economic
prosperity in a poverty-stricken region of the globe. With this in mind, McKesson has estimated
that 10,000 Chinese companies are in operation in Africa producing a value of roughly US$500
Billion amounting to 12% of total output of African Industrial Output (Financial Times 2019).
As such, it is no surprise that in only fifty years, China has gone from being a supporter of
African development to providing more financial assistance than the World Bank (Herrero and
Casanova 2016, 1).

27

Building on the concepts of investment and the Maritime Silk Road, the PRC intends to invest
almost US$1 trillion on infrastructure in Africa relating to the Belt and Road Initiative (Morreale
2018, 106). However, these investments have drawn strong criticism from foreign entities
primarily due to a sizable percentage of the loans used to construct the aforementioned projects
are interest bearing. As David Shinn noted, China has had to restructure a countless number of
African debts, but only canceling debts if loans are interest free. “That constitutes a modest
amount of Africa’s total debts with China. Most of China’s loans to Africa are concessionary and
eligible for restructuring but – as far as I can tell – not cancelling.” This may be occurring for
three reasons: one, China simply cannot afford to forgive such a vast amount of debts owed to
the state; two, many loans have been tied to social infrastructure such as roads, airports, seaports
and natural resources (Nyabiage 2019); or three, the geopolitical advantage to seizing territory in
a foreign state due to default is simply too enticing. To put this in a broader context, data was
compiled by the China-Africa Research Initiative at the Johns Hopkins University School of
Advanced International Studies and it estimated that Beijing has advanced loans worth US$143
billion to African countries since 2000 (Nyabiage 2019). But with a statement of refusal to
forgive interest bearing loans, what happens if an African state defaults on their loan?

The world got a front row view to this in 2018 when Zambia lost control of the Kenneth Kaunda
International Airport over Chinese debts and again when the African Stand reported Kenya may
soon have to hand over control of its largest and most developed port: Mombasa. At the time, the
current debt owed to China was roughly US$10 Billion and was used to primarily create a
multitude of highways connecting Mombasa and Nairobi to facilitate trade (Chaudhury 2019).
But according a report completed by Kenya’s Auditor-General, should the Kenya Railways
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Corporation (KRC) default on its loan, the Exim Bank of China could exercise its power over the
escrow account and become a principle in the Kenyan Port Authority (Nyabiage 2019). When
this is viewed at the macro-regional level, at least 40% of low-income countries in the region are
either in debt distress or at high risk, according to the International Monetary Fund (Madowo
2018).

Though the concept of seizing property upon default of a loan is by no means a new concept, the
Chinese government has taken it to the extreme and scholars such as Yun Sun have argued that
this was done intentionally. It should be noted that the PRC has yet to formally take control of
the Port of Mombasa and the Kenyan President has disregarded reports as propaganda, but the
fact still remains that should China have a desire to do so, it has the authority to take action.
Objectively, there is no better way to assert one’s dominance than by taking control of a state’s
most valuable asset and doing so legally. Thus, further entangling itself in African affairs all
through the guise of foreign direct investment and aid to assist in infrastructure in the region.
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CONCLUSION

China has been one of the world’s most interesting case studies of the 21st century. Not only as a
rising superpower throughout the 21st century, but one of the few superpowers that does not
employ outright capitalism. However, this refusal to relinquish control of its enterprises has
created a precarious position for the Communist Party in China that has produced unrelenting
turmoil and unrest. According to the World Bank, China has not seen a single meaningful
decrease in unemployment. At its statistical peak in 2009, roughly 4.7% of the population was
unemployed. More startling than this is that at the same time, roughly half (53.4%) of its
population was living on less than $5.50 per day (World Bank n.d.). Though the percentage of
people living in extreme poverty has seen a meaningful decrease, unemployment remains at
nearly 4.5% and in terms of people, has risen over the last decade.

With about 63 million citizens still without work, China has officially hit a breaking point. As
the international economy continued to grow throughout the 20th and 21st century, markets
across the world sought cheap materials. And with such a dire unemployment situation within
China, the government saw this as the perfect opportunity to increase economic prosperity while
simultaneously putting people to work. From that point of view, their assumption was correct in
believing governments the world over needed their raw materials. But countries cannot continue
to grow beyond their borders and, steadily, this driving force for the Chinese economy began to
stall. Creation and later a reliance on State Owned Enterprises was once thought to be a solution
to the economic woes. But now those drivers for hundreds of millions of people have largely
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failed. Factory cities across the country such as Hebei that were once booming have turned into
ghost towns comparable to what was seen in the wild west of the United States.

It is because of this that the Chinese government currently finds itself in search for a new venture
that will not only reinvigorate their economy again, but also eliminate structural issues. We can
now see that this venture is the Belt and Road Initiative. North countries have fully
industrialized. The need for such materials has become increasingly less relevant. So, in the eyes
of the ruling party within China, there is no better place to turn to than Globally South countries.
Those who are still in the stages of development; that do not have complex roadway systems and
effective means of transportation.

It is worth noting that this project has not been seen around the world as a project that everyone
needs to be involved in. In fact, many nations have expressed reluctance to involve themselves
even if the land or maritime route directly include them and could bolster their export to import
ratio. Some see this as a power play to spread Chinese involvement across the globe. But as it
pertains to those developing nations, they simply do not have the resources to pay for it.

Yet once again, the Chinese have a solution; call it an IOU with an asterisk. The Chinese have
agreed to begin construction on the Belt and Road Initiative without securing funding. However,
during the construction, Chinese labor must be used to build to project. With an initiative this
large cutting across vast landscapes and traversing mind-boggling terrain, the amount of
materials needed to complete it would be endless. Not only will it be Chinese labor that
ultimately constructs this massive throughway, it will be Chinese materials that make it possible.
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And should a state not be able to service its debt, the PRC would then obtain control of that
section of land. Thus, further extending its reach to other markets. In one move, President Xi
Jinping and his party have not only solved the dire issue relating to a stagnant unemployment
rate and overcapacity, but also the economic woes that this country is facing.

Though in theory this is the best possible outcome, political tension within the region is on the
rise. Prolonged unemployment has devastated the economy and the lives of its people to the
point where the citizenry no longer feels connected to the state. This can be seen through a
drastic increase in the number of riots occurring throughout China as well as the present state of
Hong Kong. Families that were once able to sustainably rely on an income from agriculture are
no longer able to do so and thus have only made the unemployment situation worse. Because Xi
Jinping has solidified his position as leader of the Chinese people, it has ultimately led to all eyes
being on him to fix structural issues that have only been exacerbated during his reign. Although
President Xi may be able to regain the support of the electorate, political instability may come to
be the dominating feature in the region.

In 2007, Nassim Nicholas Taleb, a finance professor and former stock trader wrote a book
entitled The Black Swan. The name comes from the 17th century when the world was certain
only white swans existed, that is until Willem de Vlamingh found black swans in Australia
(Australian Dictionary of Biography n.d.). Following the discovery, leaders across Europe
instantly began to recant their statement asserting there is no reason why black swans would not
exist. Taleb applied this to economics and explained that a black swan event has three
characteristics: 1. It is beyond normal expectations that is so rare that even the possibility that it
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might occur is unknown, 2. It has a catastrophic impact when it does occur, and 3. It is explained
in hindsight as if it were actually predictable.

For now, the China does have the ability to pivot and create long-lasting, sustainable growth.
However, to do so would require careful planning, an increased level of objectivity in thought,
and without an overreliance on any one solution. Conversely, if they choose to solely rely on the
Belt and Road Initiative and it fails, it could forever be known as China’s Black Swan. No state
has managed to sustain economic growth at such a staggering rate for a prolonged period of time.
As this project continues to get underway, it should be further studied to ascertain its economic
impact to the Chinese domestic market as well as international markets to develop a clear picture
on the health and longevity of Chinese economic prosperity.

33

REFERENCES
2014 International Trade Statistics Yearbook. 2015. 2014 International Trade Statistics Yearbook
United Nations. https://comtrade.un.org/pb/downloads/2014/VolI2014.pdf (November
22, 2019).
Arase, David. 2015. “China’s Two Silk Roads Initiative What It Means for Southeast Asia.”
Southeast Asian Affairs 2015: 25–45. doi: 10.1355/9789814620598-005 (November 25,
2019).
Bartik, Timothy J. 1991. Who Benefits From State and Local Economic Development Policies?
Kalamazoo, MI: W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research.
https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctvh4zh1q (July 17, 2019).
“Biography - Willem De Vlamingh.” Australian Dictionary of Biography.
http://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/vlamingh-willem-de-2760 (October 14, 2019).
Brødsgaard, Kjeld Erik, and Koen Rutten. 2017. From Accelerated Accumulation to Socialist
Market Economy in China: Economic Discourse and Development from 1953 to the
Present. Leiden: Brill. https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1163/j.ctt1w8h2tj.11 (July 12,
2019).
Chatzky, Andrew, and James McBride. 2019. “China's Massive Belt and Road Initiative.”
Council on Foreign Relations. https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/chinas-massive-beltand-road-initiative (October 14, 2019).
Chaudhury, Dipanjan Roy. 2019. “Kenya Risks Losing Port to China Casting Shadow over
India's Outreach in Eastern Africa.” The Economic Times.
https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/industry/transportation/shipping-/-transport/kenya-

34

risks-losing-port-to-china-casting-shadow-over-indias-outreach-in-easternafrica/articleshow/72136046.cms (November 25, 2019).
Chen, Roger. 1998. “An Analysis of China's Economic Development Policies and Prospects.”
Business Economics 33(3): 29–34. https://www.jstor.org/stable/23487628 (July 21,
2019).
“China Trade at a Glance: Most Recent Values.” WITS.
https://wits.worldbank.org/countrysnapshot/en/CHN/textview (October 14, 2019).
“China's Stimulus Package.” 2008. The Economist. https://www.economist.com/the-world-in2009/2008/11/12/chinas-stimulus-package (July 12, 2019).
Constitution of the People's Republic of China. 2018. Constitution of the People's Republic of
China National People’s Congress Observer.
https://npcobserver.files.wordpress.com/2018/12/PRC-Constitution-2018.pdf (July 17,
2019).
Dunhoff, G. William. “Power in America.” Who Rules America: Wealth, Income, and Power.
https://whorulesamerica.ucsc.edu/power/wealth.html (October 14, 2019).
Fang, Xingming, and H. Holly Wang. 2009. “Is Chinese High Rate of Economic Growth
Sustainable?” American Journal of Chinese Studies 16(1): 33–47.
https://www.jstor.org/stable/44289306 (November 9, 2019).
“FOCAC Mechanisms.” Forum on China-Africa Cooperation.
https://www.focac.org/eng/ltjj_3/ltjz/ (November 26, 2019).
Garcia-Herrero, Alicia, and Carlos Casanova. 2016. “Africa's Rising Commodity Export
Dependency on China.” http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2842566 (November 20, 2019).
Garnaut, Ross, and Yiping Huang. “Chapter 2.” In The Turning Point in China's Economic

35

Development, , 12–34. https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt2jbj5d.10 (July 17, 2019).
Hallding, Karl, and Sylvia Zhang. 2015. “China’s Economic Slowdown: Good News for the
Environment?” Stockholm Environment Institute.
https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep02752 (July 13, 2019).
Han, Shu. 2019. “China: Unemployment Rate by Gender 2018.” Statista.
https://www.statista.com/statistics/916316/china-unemployment-rate-by-gender/
(October 14, 2019).
Herrero, Alicia Garcia. 2019. “China's Investments In Africa: What The Data Really Say, And
The Implications For Europe.” Forbes.
https://www.forbes.com/sites/aliciagarciaherrero/2019/07/24/chinas-investments-inafrica-what-the-data-really-says-and-the-implications-for-europe/#720d75af661f
(November 26, 2019).
Liou, Kuotsai Tom. 2009. “Local Economic Development in China and the United States:
Strategies and Issues.” Public Administration Review 69: S29–30. doi: 10.1111/j.15406210.2009.02086.x (July 17, 2019).
Lo, Dic. 2007. “China's Quest for Alternative to Neo-Liberalism: Market Reform, Economic
Growth, and Labor.” The Kyoto Economic Review 76(2): 193–210.
https://www.jstor.org/stable/43213355 (July 12, 2019).
Madowo, Larry. 2018. “Should Africa Be Wary of Chinese Debt?” BBC News.
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-45368092 (November 25, 2019).
Morreale, Brittany. 2018. “Asian Powers in Africa: Win, Win, Win, Win?” China Story
Yearbook 2017: Prosperity: 104–9. doi: 10.22459/csy.04.2018.03b (November 25, 2019).
Nyabiage, Jevans. 2019. “Lender’s Remorse? China Finds Africa Projects Require a Growing

36

Wave of Debt Forgiveness.” South China Morning Post.
https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3037187/no-washingtonconsensus-tough-china-policies-says-us-academic (November 25, 2019).
Perkins, Dwight Heald. 1988. “Reforming China's Economic System.” Journal of Economic
Literature 26(2): 601–45. https://www.jstor.org/stable/2726364 (July 18, 2019).
Pilling, David, and Emily Feng. 2019. “The Other Side of Chinese Investment in Africa.”
Financial Times. https://www.ft.com/content/9f5736d8-14e1-11e9-a581-4ff78404524e
(November 26, 2019).
“Population, Total - China.” World Bank.
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL?end=2018&locations=CN&
(October 14, 2019).
“Poverty Headcount Ratio at $5.50 a Day (2011 PPP) (% of Population).” World Bank.
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.UMIC (October 14, 2019).
Rothman, Andy. 2019. “China's Debt Problem.” Investment Europe.
https://www.investmenteurope.net/opinion/4001647/china-debt (July 14, 2019).
Sun, Yun. 2016. “China's Aid to Africa: Monster or Messiah?” Brookings.
https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/chinas-aid-to-africa-monster-or-messiah/
(November 26, 2019).
The 13th Five-Year Plan for Economic and Social Development of the People's Republic of
China. The 13th Five-Year Plan for Economic and Social Development of the People's
Republic of China People's Republic of China.
http://en.ndrc.gov.cn/newsrelease/201612/P020161207645765233498.pdf (September 7,
2019).

37

The 400 Individual Income Tax Returns Reporting the Largest Adjusted Gross Incomes Each
Year, 1992-2009. The 400 Individual Income Tax Returns Reporting the Largest
Adjusted Gross Incomes Each Year, 1992-2009 Internal Revenue Service.
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/09intop400.pdf (October 14, 2019).
Tidrick, Gene M., and Jiyuan Chen. 1987. China's Industrial Reform. Oxford: Oxford Univ. Pr.
“TRADING ECONOMICS: 300.00 INDICATORS: 196 COUNTRIES.” TRADING
ECONOMICS | 300.00 INDICATORS | 196 COUNTRIES.
https://tradingeconomics.com/china/gdp-growth-annual. (July 12, 2019).
“Unemployment, Total (% of Total Labor Force) (Modeled ILO Estimate) - China.” World
Bank. https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.UEM.TOTL.ZS?locations=CN (October
14, 2019).
“United States Trade at a Glance: Most Recent Values.” WITS.
https://wits.worldbank.org/countrysnapshot/en/USA/textview (October 14, 2019).
Zhou, Cissy, and Amanda Lee. 2019. “Why Is China's Local Government Debt at 'Boiling
Point'.” South China Morning Post. https://www.scmp.com/economy/chinaeconomy/article/3003366/chinas-local-government-debt-major-risk-beijing-allows-more
(July 13, 2019).
Zhou, Jia Qi. 2013. “China ’s Local Government Debt and Economic Growth.” The Gettysburg
Economic Review 7(6).
https://cupola.gettysburg.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1047&context=ger (July 11,
2019).

38

APPENDIX A

China’s Real GDP, Employment, and Labor Force

Real GDP (A)

Employment

Labor Force

(B)

(C)

A-B

B-C

1978

100.00

100.00

100.00

0.00

0.00

1980

116.00

105.50

105.46

10.50

0.04

1985

192.90

124.21

123.18

68.69

1.03

1990

281.70

161.26

160.57

120.44

0.69

1995

502.30

169.52

169.25

332.78

0.27

2000

759.90

179.53

181.88

580.37

-2.35

2005

1195.50

188.84

191.43

1006.66

-2.58

2006

1323.42

190.28

N/A

1133.14

N/A

Source: National Bureau of Statistics, China Statistical Yearbook 2006 ; National Bureau of Statistics, Statistical
Communiqué of National Economic and Social Development in 2006
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APPENDIX B

Sino-American Trade Statistics

Trade Deficit for

Chinese Total

the United States

Exports

1998

US$56.9 billion

US$244 billion

2008

US$268 billion

US$1.62 trillion

2017

US$375.4 billion

US$2.41 trillion

Source: United States Census Bureau, Observatory of Economic Complexity
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APPENDIX C

Unemployment Rate in China from 2008 to 2018, by Gender

41

APPENDIX D

Main Economic and Social Development Indicators for the 13th Five-Year Plan Period

Indicator

•

•

•

Economic development
1. GDP (trillions of yuan)

2015

2020

5-year average
[5-year
cumulative total]

Type of
Indicator

67.7

>92.7

>6.5%

2. Overall labor productivity (10,000 yuan
per employed person)

8.7

>12

>6.6%

3.
Urbanization

Permanent urban
residents (%)

56.1

60

[3.9]

Registered urban
residents (%)

39.9

45

[5.1]

4. Value-added of the service sector (%
of GDP)

50.5

56

[5.5]

n/a

n/a

>6.5

Anticipatory

11. New urban employment (millions
of people)

n/a

n/a

[>50]

Anticipatory

12. Rural population lifted out of poverty
(millions of people)

n/a

n/a

[55.75]

Obligatory

14. Rebuilt housing in rundown
urban areas (millions of units)

n/a

n/a

[20]

Obligatory

15. Average life expectancy (years)

n/a

n/a

[1]

Anticipatory

Resources and the environment
16. Arable land (millions of hectares)

124.3

124.3

[0]

17. Increase in land newly designated for
construction (millions of hectares)

n/a

n/a

[<2.17]

Wellbeing of the people
9. Growth in disposable income per
capita (%)

Anticipatory

Obligatory

Source: The 13th Five-Year Plan for Economic and Social Development of the People's Republic of China People's
Republic of China. http://en.ndrc.gov.cn/newsrelease/201612/P020161207645765233498.pdf, p. 17-20.
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APPENDIX E

Talent Initiatives for the 13th Five-Year Plan
1. Innovator training
initiatives
Set up scientist studios for fields where China has competitive strengths,
§
focusing particularly on supporting and training young and middle-aged leading
scientific and technological innovators;
§
Make focused efforts to support innovators and entrepreneurs working in science
and technology and establish centers for others to learn from them to foster innovative
talent.
2. Young talent development initiatives
§
Establish national young talent training centers for outstanding college students at
quality research universities and research institutes for basic disciplines where the strengths
of the respective university or institute lie;
§
Select the best talent from new senior secondary school and college graduates every
year to participate in advanced training at first-class universities outside China and keep
track of their progress.
3. Quality improvement programs for business executives
§
Train entrepreneurs who have a perspective on global needs, think strategically, and
are innovative;
§
Train 10,000 business executives in strategic planning, capital operations, quality
control, human resources management, finance, accounting, and law.
4. The Talent 1,000 Initiative and the Talent 10,000 Initiative
§
Bring in approximately 10,000 high-caliber talented individuals from overseas to
make innovations or start businesses;
§
Select from within China and offer support to approximately 10,000 urgently
needed, highly talented individuals.
5. Knowledge refresher programs for professional and technical personnel
§
Train one million high-caliber, urgently needed, and key professional and technical
personnel each year;
§
Establish national continuing education centers, drawing on existing education
institutions at universities, research institutes, and large enterprises.
Source: The 13th Five-Year Plan for Economic and Social Development of the People's Republic of China People's
Republic of China. http://en.ndrc.gov.cn/newsrelease/201612/P020161207645765233498.pdf, p. 30-31.
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APPENDIX F

Transportation Projects
§
Basically complete construction on a coastal high-speed railway from Dandong
to Fangchenggang, a coastal expressway, and a high-speed railway along the Yangtze
River from Shanghai to Chengdu;
§

Speed up the construction of highways along our borders;

§
Build railways along our borders such as the Hotan-Ruoqiang Railway, the
Luoguhe-Laoheishan Railway along the border in the Northeast, and the ChengduLhasa Railway;
§

Press ahead with construction of transborder thoroughfares between China and

neighboring countries and thoroughfares along the Belt and Road routes;
§
Build logistics platforms for international freight trains in Ürümqi, Lanzhou, and
other major hub cities along the Belt and Road routes;
§

Construct the Shenzhen-Zhongshan Bridge.

Source: The 13th Five-Year Plan for Economic and Social Development of the People's Republic of China
People's Republic of China. http://en.ndrc.gov.cn/newsrelease/201612/P020161207645765233498.pdf, p. 17-20.
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SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIALS
Figure 1: Chinese Non-Financial Debt-to-GDP Ratio by Sector
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SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIALS
Figure 2: Land and Sea Corridors of the Belt and Road Initiative
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